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Trusts - Mutual Funds - Allocation of
Capital Gains Distributions
I. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TRUSTEE
The fundamental premise underlying the allocation of all trust
receipts is that any return of capital (including accretions thereto)
constitutes principal, whereas ordinary earnings on investments are
income.1 Since the maintenance of this distinction determines which
party or parties will benefit, the trustee is under an obligation to
carefully and correctly allocate receipts between the life beneficiary
and the remainderman.' Likewise, the trustee must exercise a reason-
able degree of care, skill, and caution in investing the funds entrusted
to him.' He has a duty to make such investments as a prudent man
would make with his own funds having as a primary concern both
the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the
income to be derived therefrom. Absent a contrary indication in the
trust instrument, this goal should be maximum income consistent
with the preservation of the trust res.' The propriety of each invest-
ment is judged as of the time such investment was made, ignoring
subsequent effects not reasonably susceptible of knowledge or antici-
pation at that time.' The trustee naturally may rely on the advice of
others, but such reliance is no excuse for an imprudent investment.!
Several factors which the trustee should consider in formulating his
investment policy are the settlor's intent; the term and marketability
of the particular investment and the nature of other investments
made; the value and probable duration of the trust; the probable
market conditions upon dissolution; and the needs of the individual
beneficiaries considering their tax situations, other income, and earn-
ing capacities. The result is that the trustee is limited in the types of
investments he may make by three determinants-the trust instru-
ment, applicable statutes, and the "prudent man" rule.8
13 Scott, Trusts S 233.1 (2d ed. 1956).
23 Scott, Trusts § 233 (2d ed. 1956).
' The trustee is liable to the beneficiary whose trust estate has been harmed by his im-
prudence or lack of skill in the making or disposing of investments. The extent of the
trustee's liability is the amount necessary to rectify the error and place the beneficiary in
the financial position he would have occupied had the duty been performed with reasonable
care and skill. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 706 (2d ed. 1951).
Both direct and consequential damages may be awarded. In re Cook's Will, 136 N.J.
Eq. 123, 40 A.2d 805 (Prerogative Ct. 1945); see also Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 701
(2d ed. 1951).
" King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869); Restatement, Trusts § 227 (2d ed. 1959).
'Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 611 (2d ed. 1951).
6 Purdy v. Lynch, 145 N.Y. 462, 40 N.E. 232 (1895).
'Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 541 (2d ed. 1951).
83 Scott, Trusts § 277 (2d ed. 1956).
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II. ALTERNATIVES FOR TRUST INVESTMENT
The trustee desiring to invest trust capital in securities has three
alternatives. He may (1) purchase directly on the open market,
(2) enter into a common trust fund, or (3) purchase mutual fund
shares. Within each of these categories he also must choose, in light
of the particular duties owed to his beneficiaries, between those com-
panies or funds emphasizing growth and those emphasizing income.
The first investment alternative is fitting for the larger trust which
can successfully achieve diversification, and thereby minimize its risk
of loss. On the other hand, the trust with less available capital should
find the latter alternatives more advantageous. By pooling his re-
sources with those of other trusts under a single common trustee or
by investing in a mutual fund, the trustee can avoid the hazards of
a limited portfolio and at the same time gain the benefits of expert
management. In the mutual fund the trustee purchases shares, re-
ceiving thereon dividends and distributions from interest, dividends,
and capital gains earned by the mutual on its portfolio. In the com-
mon trust fund, each contributing trustee has a proportionate interest
in the portfolio determined by the amount of capital he has invested.'
III. MUTUAL FUNDS-TWO VIEWS
The primary purpose of investment in open-end regulated invest-
ment companies ° (so-called "mutual funds") is diversification or
spreading of the risk. A second purpose is the access to expert man-
agement. Payments are in the form of "dividends" (ordinary income
from the investment portfolio) and "distributions" (capital gains on
sale of securities). A factor that will influence the trustee greatly in
deciding whether to invest in a mutual fund is the manner in which
payments from the fund are to be allocated between principal and
income, for this allocation will affect the manner in which he has
carried out the duty of providing the life beneficiary with maximum
"[The] trustee invests the funds of several trusts in a group of securities, each estate
having a fractional interest in the whole group of securities . . . " determined by the
respective amount it has advanced. 3 Scott, Trusts § 227.9 (2d ed. 1956).
The Revenue Service defines the common trust fund as "a fund maintained by a bank-
(1) exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of moneys contributed there-
to by the bank in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian; and (2)
in conformity with the rules and regulations, prevailing from time to time, of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System .... " Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 584(a).
" "The open-end company is obligated to redeem or repurchase its shares from holders
upon request. . . . [T]he amount received by a shareholder, upon turning in his share,
is roughly the amount he would have received if the company had been liquidated on the
day of redemption." The closed-end company is under no such obligation, and the value of
its stock is determined by the market factors of supply and demand. Prentice-Hall Ency-
clopedic Dictionary of Business Finance 353-54 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
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income consistent with preservation of the trust res. The crux of
the allocation difficulty with respect to trusts lies in the theory of the
nature of the mutual fund. It must be determined whether a mutual
fund is analogous to an ordinary industrial corporation-a "separate
entity"-or to a common trust fund-a mere "conduit." This deter-
mination is crucial because, under the separate entity theory, sales of
securities by the fund are treated as sales from inventory and thus as
ordinary income to the trust allocable to the life beneficiary. Under
the conduit theory, such distributions are returns of capital allocable
to principal, just as if the trustee had invested directly rather than
through a mutual fund intermediary.
Professor Bogert," in propounding the separate entity view, reasons
that the investment company does not dispose of a capital asset when
it sells part of its portfolio because it deals with securities as its stock
in trade. He draws an analogy between the mutual fund and the
ordinary corporation. Since any sales from "inventory" generate
ordinary income, any distributions arising therefrom should not be-
long to the trust corpus but to the life beneficiary. Following this
rationale, previous decisions, notably those of New York" and Mary-
land,a have allocated both "dividends" and "distributions" to income
wherever payment in cash rather than stock is possible. As pointed
out by the late Mayo A. Shattuck, 4 however, difficulties arise under
this approach with respect to the allocation of net capital losses. The
trustee either must charge such losses to the income beneficiary, sub-
jecting him to the extreme ups and downs of mercantile prosperity,
or allow the corpus to bear all net capital losses, thereby penalizing
the remainderman." Professor Scott is in accord with Mr. Shattuck
on the above views."6 He argues also that there is no logical reason for
a different result in the case in which an investment is made by means
of a mutual fund rather than by direct investment in the securities.
"[C]apital gains received by trustee on sale of securities held by him
as trustee are principal . . . " and distributions of capital gains by an
investment company should also be principal. 7
A more accurate analogy than that drawn by Bogert is the com-
"1Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 858 (2d ed. 1951).
1211 re Byrne's Estate, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Surr. Ct. 1948); In re Bruce's
Trust, 192 Misc. 523, 81 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct., 1948).
13 Rosenberg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601 (1960).
"4 Shattuck, Capital Gain Distributions, 88 Trusts & Estates 429 (1949).
""Why should they [the remaindermen] suffer all the penalties of investment hazard
and gain none of the fruits of actual accretions to capital?" Ibid.
" 3 Scott, Trusts § 236.14 (2d ed. 1956).
17 Ibid.
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mon trust fund." Its purpose likewise is that of achieving diversifi-
cation of risk, but it is merely a "conduit" through which this pur-
pose is attained. The similarity between the common trust fund and
the mutual fund in this respect is substantiated by an examination of
several factors. First, the usual method of stock valuation lends
itself readily to conduit analysis. The per share value of the fund is
equivalent to the net market value of the fund's portfolio, including
both net unrealized capital gains and gains which are realized but
undistributed, divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
Ignoring nominal management fees, any net capital gain of the fund
results in an identical proportionate gain in the value of the mutual
fund shares. Likewise, any distribution of realized capital gains
necessarily must cause a reduction in per share value which is identical
in amount to the per share distribution. Following this line of reason-
ing, the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires mutual funds
not to make distributions except from undistributed net income,
exclusive of profit and loss on sale of securities, unless they are
"accompanied by a written statement which adequately discloses the
source or sources of such payment."'" The investment company stock-
holder thereby always will know (1) whether the pershare value of
his stock is affected and (2) whether he is entitled to favorable in-
come tax treatment.
Secondly, the Internal Revenue Code allows the mutual fund
shareholder to treat any capital gain "distribution" as a gain from the
sale or exchange of a long term capital asset; but any "dividend,"
stemming from interest and dividends earned on portfolio securities,
must be treated as ordinary income."° Moreover, unlike the ordinary
corporation, no surtax is payable by the fund as long as it distributes
at least ninety per cent of earnings from interest and dividends."
The dividend-distribution dichotomy thus is maintained, and all tax
consequences pass through the fund to the shareholder unchanged.
Furthermore, this distinction is generally accepted within the mutual
fund industry itself. The Investment Company Institute states that
dividends from ordinary income and capital gains distributions are
" See note 9 supra.
" I$ U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1958).20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 852(b) (3) (B) (Subchapter M-Regulated Investment
Companies).
2' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 852(a) (1). Neither is there surtax on capital gains which
are distributed to shareholders. Tax is paid by the fund on any capital gains retained, but




"different in character and should be viewed differently.""2 Citing the
Internal Revenue Code treatment, the Institute continues, "If it is
desired, despite these differences, to have both dividends and capital
gains paid to the life-tenant, the instrument should provide for it."2
Finally, adding further substantiation to this point, the Uniform
Revised Principal and Income Act provides that all distributions by
a regulated investment company, other than those from ordinary
income, "including distributions from capital gains . . .. whether in
the form of cash or an option to take new stock .... are principal."2
This section replaces Section 5 of the Uniform Principal and Income
Act, which set out only the general "Massachusetts rules" regarding
the allocation of distributions received by a trustee.25 The more ex-
plicit rules set forth in the new section to deal with investment com-
panies reflect a complete rejection by the Commissioners of the
separate entity theory in favor of the conduit theory. Professor Scott
publicly reaffirmed his approval of this reasoning by stating that
"the revised draft" has adopted the proper rule."2
IV. TAIT V. PECK2
In 1935 the plaintiff's husband executed an inter vivos trust in
which he gave his wife a life estate in certain shares of Linden Asso-
ciates, a Massachusetts trust, (later converted into 55,434 shares of
Broad Street Investing Corporation, an open-end regulated invest-
ment company), with remainder over to the defendants. The trust
instrument gave no indication whatever of settlor's intent with re-
spect to allocation of mutual fund payments. In 1961 Broad Street
paid to the trustees certain cash "dividends from income" and, sub-
sequently, delivered 1,463 of its shares pursuant to a cash-stock op-
tion as "distribution of capital gain." These shares were added to
the trust corpus. Trustees maintained that such "distribution" was
a return of capital allocable to corpus and stated that they would
take the same position with respect to similar distributions in the
2 Investment Company Institute, Mutual Fund Shares-An aid to Attorneys 24 (1962).
(The Institute filed an amicus curiae brief in the instant case.)
23 Ibid.
2 Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act § 6(c) (adopted Aug. 2, 1962). It is in-
teresting to note that Professor George G. Bogert, a leading advocate of the separate entity
analysis, headed the committee which adopted this revision.
25 See text accompanying notes 47 and 48 infra.
'Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act § 6(c).
27 101 Trusts & Estates 894, 897 (1962). See also Shattuck, Capital Gains Distributions,
88 Trusts & Estates 160 (1949) for a good statement of the rationale by the late Mayo A.
Shattuck, one of the most knowledgeable and experienced Massachusetts attorneys in the
fields of trusts and estates.
28 Mass. -, 194 N.E.2d 707 (1963).
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future. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to ascertain whether
this "distribution of gain" should be considered income or principal
for trust accounting purposes. The probate court "reserved and re-
ported" the evidence and all questions of law to the Supreme Judicial
Court. In the latter hearing the court placed much emphasis on the
nature of mutual funds and the purposes of investment therein. The
conduit theory" was expressly adopted, the court noting that utiliza-
tion of this theory by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
"can be taken as reflecting a considered current view of what is in
the public interest.'O
Consequently, the analogy drawn by the court is that of the
common trust fund," which, like the mutual fund, achieves diversi-
fication and minimization of risk along with expert management.
Opponents of this analogy argue that a material difference exists
between the two types of funds in that the realized gains of an in-
vestment company are distributed to its shareholders (primarily for
tax reasons), whereas those of a common trust fund are not. The
court pointed out, however, that this difference stems not from a
dissimilarity in substance but merely from a dissimilarity in manner
of administration. It noted that if the trustee elects to take all capital
gain distributions in stock, he effects the identical substantive result
as does the common trust fund, because he maintains his proportion-
ate ownership in the mutual fund's portfolio. The contrary argument
of Professor Bogert states that allocating only dividends to the life
beneficiary yields a "sub-normal trust investment yield."" This,
however, "does not change the substance of the investment as a
reasonable attempt at risk diversification similar to that of the com-
mon trust fund."" For these reasons, the court adopted the rule that
distributions by a regulated investment company from capital gains,
in whatever form, are to be allocated to principal. It thereby re-
pudiated the separate entity theory on which the previous decisions
in other jurisdictions were grounded and indicated their decreasing
precedential value." It should be noted that the instant case was de-
cided on common law principles, as Massachusetts has not adopted
29 See notes 18-27 supra and accompanying text.
32 194 N.E.2d at 713.
3' See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
12 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 858 (2d ed. 1951).
33194 N.E.2d at 713.
34 See notes 12 and 13 supra.
32Of particular significance is the new N.Y. Pets. Prop. Law § 17a (effective June 1,
1964) incorporating the "conduit" analysis recently adopted in the Uniform Revised Princi-
pal and Income Act (see note 24 supra). This constitutes a complete statutory reversal of
the rule engendered by prior New York decisions.
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the Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act. However, significant
weight is afforded this Act' as persuasive authority in the court's
opinion.
An important factor in the determination of allocation to princi-
pal was the Internal Revenue Code. It is interesting to observe its
pervasive influence. First, the Code affects the mutual fund industry
by causing practically total distribution of net gains." This greatly
affects the concept of the nature of the mutual fund as a conduit.
Likewise, the Code has a manifest effect on trust administration be-
cause from a tax standpoint capital gains of the investment company
are capital gains to its shareholders." Because this treatment achieves
lower tax rates, it increases the desirability of mutual fund invest-
ment. At the same time it is of consequence in resolving allocation
problems, as evidenced by the weight afforded it in the instant case.
Since the capital gains distributions remain in corpus, the income
beneficiary's return may be inadequate." Professor Scott attributes
this inadequacy primarily to management fees and suggests that, if
the trustee invests substantially in mutual funds, his fees be reduced
by an appropriate amount because he thereby delegates his duties
of investment management." In the alternative, as the court says,
"It may be a sound reason for a trustee to refrain from investing
in investment company shares. . . ."' But this fact does not change
the nature of the investment itself, and in light of the substance
of the transaction (the capital gains distribution) there is no logical
or practical basis for a different allocation in direct investment than
in investment by means of a conduit.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, it is clear that money derived from sales out of the portfolio
of a mutual fund is allocated to principal. But acceptance of the
analysis of the mutual fund as a conduit raises a further problem.
Is the source of the dividend received by the fund from its invest-
ments to be considered in a determination of the proper method of
allocation to principal and to income? If, for example, the fund re-
3' Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act § 6(c).
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 852(a)(1) allows investment companies which distribute
at least 90% of earnings from interest and dividends to be exempt from taxation on the
earnings so distributed. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 852(b)(3)(B). See also note 20 supra and accompanying
text.
"9See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
4°3 Scott, Trusts § 227.9A (2d ed. 1956). The trustee has a duty not to delegate his
investment duties to others. 3 Scott, Trusts § 171 (2d ed. 1956).
41 194 N.E.2d at 712. (Emphasis added.)
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ceives and passes on to its shareholder a dividend from a corporation
which is in fact the result of sales of the corporation's capital assets,
the correct allocation by a trustee once again is uncertain. Theoretic-
ally, the answer should be determined by applying whatever rule
obtains in the particular jurisdiction with respect to dividends re-
ceived from direct investment, most notably, either the Massachu-
setts' or the Pennsylvania rule.' However, the already complex
Pennsylvania rule becomes inconceivably demanding in this situa-
tion, because it would require the trustee holding mutual fund shares
to determine the true source of every dividend received by the fund
throughout its portfolio. According to this rule "ordinary" dividends
(those paid out of net earnings of the corporation) are allocable to
the life beneficiary, but "extraordinary" dividends (representing a
depletion of the corporation's capital assets and thus of the "intact
value" of the shares) are returned to the trust res." Under the Mas-
sachusetts rule, or "rule of simplicity," on the other hand, there would
be no such necessity. This view, endorsed both by the Restatement of
the Law of Trusts"' and by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws,"8 regards "cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock
dividends, however made, as capital."'" Since any cash dividends
would be distributed as a "dividend" to fund shareholders, the alloca-
tion would always be to income as the Massachusetts rule prescribes.
Any stock dividends would be retained by the fund and allocated
to corpus upon "distribution" to the trustee. However, a corollary
to the basic Massachusetts rule is that if the trustee has an option to
receive either cash or stock, the option is treated as a cash dividend
and thus as income." Should the fund, given such option, elect pay-
ment in stock, the ultimate result upon sale of the stock by the fund
would be allocation to principal-a result that seems to be contrary
to the dictates of the Massachusetts rule. Because of its workability
this rule is clearly preferable to the Pennsylvania rule in connection
with the mutual fund, but the uncertainty which exists in the option
situation must be clarified. One remedy would be to require the
mutual fund to designate what part of the capital gains distribution,
if any, resulted from the sale of such "elected" stock.
"'Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868).
43Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
44See 3 Scott, Trusts 55 236.3-236.6 (2d ed. 1956); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 844
(2d ed. 1951).
*"Restatement, Trusts 5 236 (2d ed. 1959).
"Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act § 6(a).
47Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 108 (1868).
48Smith v. Cotting, 231 Mass. 42, 120 N.E. 177 (1918); Restatement, Trusts § 236(c)
(2d ed. 1959).
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